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III. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Defendant asserts that she "submitted the Affidavit of Jim 
Lancaster and Supplemental Affidavit of Jim Lancaster in support of 
her motion." See Appelleefs Br., p. 4. Defendant, then, accuses 
plaintiff of submitting an affidavit of her own at the eleventh 
hour, and of attempting to argue that the release is ambiguous. See 
Appellee's Br., p. 4. Defendant actually submitted Lancaster's 
supplemental affidavit with her reply brief below, not her original 
motion (R. 40-49). Defendant argued in her reply, for the first 
time, that the "Release . . . [was] intended to apply to [her]" (R. 
45), as opposed to her husband. Plaintiff filed her affidavit in 
response to this new evidence and new argument. Plaintiff did not 
argue that the release was ambiguous. She noted that Lancaster's 
supplemental affidavit was extrinsic evidence which implicated that 
issue. As defendant's counsel stated at oral argument: 
[T]he reason for the affidavit in the first 
place was that the [defendant's] reply 
memorandum included a supplemental affidavit 
from Jim Lancaster, which up to that time had 
not mentioned any thing about the intent of 
the parties. . . . I would agree with counsel 
here that the release document speaks for 
itself, and you could bring in affidavits to 
say, well, I intended to do this or that. But 
we have exactly what the documents say, and 
unless it's ambiguous, the [sic] it's not in 
issue. And I don't think [it] is ambiguous. 
6/21/96 Tr., p. 10. 
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This sequence is critical to understanding how the issue of 
ambiguity and the extrinsic evidence fit into the arguments made 
before this Court. Plaintiff is not asserting that the release is 
ambiguous, or attempting to introduce extrinsic evidence in order 
to reform the release. She is responding to defendant's attempt to 
inject extrinsic evidence without adhering to the prescribed 
analytical process (i.e., that finding an ambiguity is a pre-
requisite to considering extrinsic evidence). 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant had two mutually exclusive alternatives for meeting 
her burden of proving the affirmative defense of release. See 
Krauss v. Utah State Dept. of Transportation, 852 P.2d 1014, 1023 
(Utah App. 1993) (party not named in release must prove that it is 
discharged). She could show that she was discharged under the 
terms of the release, but only without relying upon any extrinsic 
evidence. Alternatively, she could offer extrinsic evidence of 
intent, bvxt only if the release is in some way ambiguous. In that 
event, Ms. Thornock's affidavit disputes defendant's evidence, and 
summary judgment is still improper. 
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(A) 
UMDER SECTION 78-27-42, DEFENDANT CANNOT 
BE DISCHARGED BY THE RELEASE 
1. Section 78-27-42 is Controlling Here, 
Defendant argues, that § 78-27-42, U.C.A, applies only to 
"multiple tortfeasor situation[s]" and, that this is not such a 
situation. See Appellee's Br., p. 14. Defendant also contends that 
her husband is not a "defendant," as defined in § 78-27-37, U.C.A. 
Thus, according to defendant, the traditional common-law rules 
apply, under which a general release discharges anyone involved. 
See Appellee's Br., pp. 17-19. 
Defendant's argument proves too much. The common-law rule, to 
which she seeks to return, provides that the release of a 
tortfeasor discharges other joint tortfeasors. See Catmull v. 
Medical Integrated Systems, Inc., 30 Utah 2d 334, 336-37, 517 P.2d 
1023 (1974). Mr. Jensen is, by defendant's reasoning, no more a 
"tortfeasor" than he is a "defendant." Thus, the very premise 
which Defendant would use to remove § 78-27-42, necessarily 
precludes applying the common-law rule. If defendant's reasoning 
is correct, the common-law does not apply either because it applies 
only to joint tortfeasors. Such semantic maneuvering is, in fact, 
unnecessary — except, perhaps to illustrate the contradiction in 
defendant's position. The better approach is to acknowledge that 
§ 78-27-42 does apply here. 
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Mr. Jensen is a "defendant," for purposes of this release, 
precisely because he is named in it. Defendant's original position 
below necessarily assumes, that Mr. Jensen was the intended 
releasee. As noted, defendant did not offer extrinsic evidence 
purporting to show that she was the intended releasee, until after 
plaintiff raised § 78-27-42. Instead, defendant argued that she 
was an additional releasee. That implies that there is a proper 
named releasee -- Mr* Jensen. Defendant simply cannot rely upon a 
document, which on its face releases claims against Mr. Jensen, 
then argue that there are no such claims. By offering a release 
naming her husband, defendant has necessarily adraitted that he i& 
a "defendant." 
Moreover, the term "defendant" should be construed liberally, 
not technically. £s originally enacted, § 78-27-42 used the term 
"tortfeasor," instead of "defendant." .See Krukiewicz v. Draperf 
725 P-2d 1349, 1350 (Utah 1986). "Tortfeasor" was defined in terms 
of actual liability — not claimed liability, as "defendant" is in 
the present version of the statutes. Id. In Krukiewicz, the 
plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident by an employee of 
the defendant. Plaintiff released the employee, whereupon the 
defendant claimed to bk discharged as well, notwithstanding § 78-
27-42. The defendant made an argument similar to the one made here 
-- that the statute did not apply because he was not "a joint 
tortfeasor." The court rejected that argument, although an 
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employer is technically not a joint tortfeasor. See 728 P«2d at 
1352. 
Krukiewicz shows that the term "defendant" should be 
interpretted liberally, rather than technically. Indeed, by 
changing from the term "tortfeasor" (defined by actual liability) 
to the term "defendant" (defined by potential liability), the 
legislature has moved in a more liberal, less technical direction. 
Krukiewicz also contradicts defendant's theory that the narrow 
purpose of § 78-27-42 is to carve out an exception to the common 
law for a very specific and limited class of cases. It clearly has 
a broader purpose — to serve as a sort of parol evidence rule for 
releases, under which an unnamed party cannot claim to be 
discharged. 
Section § 78-27-42 furthers that purpose by substituting a 
clear and certain rule for the relative uncertainties of the 
common-law approach. Under § 78-27-42, the scope of a release does 
not depend upon the nuances of the underlying case, but upon what 
the release says. Assessing the releasee's relative actual fault 
would undermine that process and purpose. As a practical matter, 
that is also a difficult inquiry. Holding that a party named in the 
release is a "defendant," is a more clear and certain rule. It is 
more consistent with the broad remedial purpose of § 78-27-42 to 
preclude a party not named in a release from asserting the release 
as a defense. 
S 
2. Defendant is not Sufficiently Described in the Release with a 
Sufficient Degree of Specificity, 
Defendant claims to be discharged, even if § 78-27-42 applies, 
pursuant to language referring to Lowell Jensen's "heirs" or by 
general references to any liable parties. The first contention is 
not only inconsistent with the preclusion against relying upon 
"boilerplate" see Child v, Newsome, 892 P.2d 9 (Utah 1995), but 
also with the terms of the release itself, Ms, Jensen's liability 
here is not as an "heir" of her husband, but as an active 
tortfeasor. See e.g,, Gordon v, CRS Consulting Engineers, Inc. 
820 P.2d 492, 494 (Utah App. 1991), Defendant's second contention 
is squarely precluded by Child, wherein the release, which was held 
to be insufficient, contained an identical reference to "all other 
persons, firms and corporations." 892 P. 2d at 11* Defendant 
cannot argue that such language, which was rejected in Child, des-
cribes her here with a sufficient "degree of specificity," Id, 
The clear holding in Child is that boilerplate language, such as 
defendant seeks to rely upon here, is ineffective to expand the 
scope of a release beyond the named party. 
The Court, in Chi Id, adopted what is regarded as the strict 
construction of the statutory phrase "unless the release so 
provides," 892 P.2d at 11 (phrase "must be construed narrowly 
. . . [to avoid controverting] the statute's purpose by allowing 
general release language . . • to discharge [a non-named] 
tortfeasor")• Many jurisdictions, which have adopted a similar 
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version of the model act, continue to allow non-parties to a 
release to rely upon broad, general language. Utah does not. See 
6 A.L.R.5th 883, § 7, Supplement at p. 27. That annotation 
classifies Utah, based upon Child, as a proponent of the strict 
view, under which general language is completely ineffective. Id. 
Whatever "describing a party with some degree of specificity" 
means, it cannot include "boilerplate language." See 892 P.2d at 
ll.1 
Defendant's belated third-party beneficiary argument is also 
foreclosed by Child and § 78-27-42. See Appellee's Br., pp. 20-22. 
Defendant has no evidence that she was an intended third-party 
beneficiary, other than the boilerplate language of the release 
which is insufficient as a matter of law. See Child, 892 P. 2d at 
11. Defendant's extrinsic evidence of intent does not support the 
view that she was an intended third-party beneficiary. It purports 
to show that she was the intended party to the release. 
Indeed, the case defendant cites, Palmer v. Davisf 808 P. 2d 
128 (Utah App. 1991) is an appellate court decision rendered four 
years before the Supreme Court decided Child. Its precedential 
value is, therefore, somewhat questionable. See 892 P. 2d at 11, n. 
4 (expressly overruling, in part, Krauss v. UDOT, 852 P. 2d 1014 
Neither Child nor the case at bar, both of which involve 
boilerplate, presents an opportunity to decide what type of 
description might be sufficient. Although it is an intriguing 
academic exercise, resolving that question here is neither 
necessary nor warranted. 
7 
(Utah App. 1993)). Additionally, defendant has omitted to discuss 
some pertinent aspects of Palmer. The release, there, mentioned 
Davis by name. See 808 P. 2d at 129, It reserved plaintiff's 
rights against Davis "except as he may be an employee of [the 
released parties]." .Id.. The court found that it was undisputed 
that Davis was an employee. 808 P. 2d at 130. The third-party 
beneficiary discussion was directed to plaintiff's argument that, 
as a non-party to the releasey Davis could not be discharged even 
if he was an employee. 
(B| 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS OF EXTRIM8IC EVIDENCE 
Plaintiff has not argued, here or below, that the release is 
ambiguous. On the contrary, she has maintained that it plainly 
discharges only Lowell Jensen, and that there is no ground for 
using extrinsic evidence to add to, or change, the names of the 
releasee. Indeed, doing so should be prohibited by § 73-27-42 and 
Child, 892 P. 2d 9, Defendant has sought, to rely upon extrinsic 
evidence, albeit without actually arguing that the. release is 
ambiguous* This is improper, .See Gordcmr B20 P. 2d. at 493 
(ff [ejxtrinsic evidence may be considered only if the agreement is 
ambiguous or . . . incomplete,'*). All extrinsic evidence, including 
Lancaster's supplemental affidavit, is inadmissible unless there 
is an ambiguity., Indeed if. defendant wants to pretend that 
plaintiff is asserting an ambiguity and argue that there is none, 
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then no extrinsic evidence need be considered. What defendant 
cannot do is to deny that the release is ambiguous, yet have 
Lancaster's affidavit (and only that evidence) considered. See 
Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285^ 294 (Utah App 
1994). 
Defendant also asserts, that Ms. Thornock's affidavit "is both 
unreliable and irrelevant." See Appellee's Br., p. 25. In the 
first place, reliability is a matter of credibility, which is for 
the jury. Contrary to Defendant's assertion, the affidavit does 
not conflict with the physical existence of the release. Rather, 
it contradicts Mr. Lancaster's version of his meeting with Ms. 
Thornock. As far as relevancy is concerned, how can an affidavit 
relating to conversations which defendant put in issue be 
irrelevant? If Lancaster's version of those events is relevant, 
Ms. Thornock's testimony as to the same events must be also. 
Plaintiff's affidavit is not merely relevant, but also 
sufficient to preclude summary judgment. This is because defendant 
— not plaintiff — is seeking to modify the plain terms of that 
document. In this regard, defendant's burden is to show that the 
parties were in agreement as to the change she seeks. See Warner 
v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 666, 669 (Utah App. 1992) ("[t]o reform a 
contract, the party claiming mistake must prove ^that the minds of 
both parties had been in agreement. . . • ' " ) • 
Even if Ms. Thornock's understanding conflicts with some terms 
of the agreement, it does not agree with defendant's understanding 
(which also conflicts with the terms of the writing) . It is, 
therefore, sufficient to preclude summary judgment predicated upon 
changing those terms. Indeed, as plaintiff has noted, a release 
which fails to reflect a meeting of the minds may not even be 
valid. Sea Simonsen v. Travis, 728 P.2d 999 (Utah 193 6)*2 More-
over, the purpose of parol evidence is to clarify a writing, not to 
change it, as defendant would do here. See Brown v. Richards, 840 
P.2d 143, 148 (Utah App. 1992), 
(C) 
PLAINTIFF HAS NOT INJECTED NEW AHGUMEKTH ON APPEAL 
Defendant accuses plaintiff of attempting to assert new argu-
ments on appeal, such as fraud, overreaching or lack of capacity. 
This is untrue. First, plaintiff has not argued that the judgment 
should be reversed for any of these reasons. She has simply 
pointed to facts which might relate to such matters. Second, these 
facts were also asserted below — so there is nothing new here. 
Indeed, plaintiff's purpose in discussing these facts here is 
precisely the same as it was below. Primarily, they relate to the 
meeting between plaintiff and Lancaster, wbicn defendant has put in 
issue. Even if the facts raised by plaintiff are not sufficient to 
2Plaintiff has not, as defendant claims, cited this case in an 
attempt to invalidate the release. She has cited it to demonstrate 
that the path, which defendant must take to modify the release, may 
lead to its being invalid. 
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invalidate the release, they are certainly relevant to opposing 
defendant's attempts to modify it. 
Additionally, the discussion of matters such as fraud or 
overreaching serves to put this matter into perspective and to 
illustrate the unfairness of defendant's position. Indeed, it is 
the likely insufficiency of these grounds which makes discussing 
them all the more pointient. Notwithstanding some rather question-
able conduct by Lancaster, it is doubtful that plaintiff could 
avoid the release. She is probably bound by her ill-advised 
signature on that document. The point is, that defendant should 
play by the same rules. Defendant should be bound by her insurer's 
drafting a release naming only her husband. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
Under Child, § 78-27-42 precludes a party who is not named in 
a release from relying upon it. That is precisely the situation 
here. The reasons why defendant was not named are irrelevant, as 
are her insurer's unilateral intentions. There is no legal basis 
for construing or modifying this release to discharge defendant. 
At most, there is a plausible issue as to intent, which is disputed 
and cannot be resolved on summary judgment. 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein and in Appellant's 
Brief, the judgment of the court below must be reversed. 
11 
DATED this ^C day of . 1997, 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Appellant 
By: s-^y- ~ (^ *—>\y 
NANCY MISMASH 
ALBERT W. GRAY 
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